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It has been well documented that the education premium measured by the wage 
difference between university and high school graduates has remained constant over the 
past two decades in Canada. Despite this stable pattern at the aggregate level, skill-biased 
technology could have important implications for the inter-industry wage structure. In a 
multi-sector economy where technological innovations are skewed towards certain 
industries, imperfect labour mobility implies a positive relationship between the 
education premium and the technological change in industry. Using data from the Survey 
of Consumer Finance and the Labour Force Survey, the authors obtain empirical results 
that would appear to confirm this link: university graduates in research and development- 
intensive industries are better paid. Yet, this positive correlation is largely due to the fact 
that high-tech industries attract more professionals who are more educated than the 
average university graduate. 
 
JEL classification: J31, O30 





De nombreuses études ont montré que la prime à l’éducation, soit la différence de salaire 
entre les diplômés du niveau universitaire et ceux du niveau secondaire, est demeurée 
constante au Canada au cours des deux dernières décennies. Malgré la stabilité de cette 
prime à l’échelle globale, les changements technologiques qui favorisent le recours à une 
main-d’œuvre qualifiée pourraient avoir d’importantes répercussions sur la structure 
intersectorielle des salaires. Dans une économie multisectorielle où les innovations 
techniques ont tendance à être concentrées dans certaines branches d’activité, une 
mobilité imparfaite de la main-d’œuvre implique une relation positive entre la prime à 
l’éducation et l’évolution technologique d’un secteur. Les résultats empiriques que les 
auteurs obtiennent à partir des données de l’Enquête sur les finances des consommateurs 
et de l’Enquête sur la population active semblent confirmer que les diplômés 
universitaires travaillant dans les branches à forte intensité de recherche et 
développement sont mieux rémunérés. Cependant, cette corrélation positive tient en 
grande partie au fait que les industries de pointe attirent davantage de professionnels 
ayant une formation plus poussée que la moyenne des diplômés universitaires. 
 
Classification JEL : J31, O30 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés du travail 
   1 
[We are experiencing] one of those rare, perhaps once in-a-century events — a 
structural technological advance. This acceleration seems to have had two 
important side effects. First, it has a major influence on the distribution of income 
in this country. . . . 
 
As ideas become especially valuable relative to physical activity in the creation of 
value-added, education and intellectual skill become an increasingly major 
determinant of income. 
 
Alan Greenspan 




1.  Introduction 
Technological change has important implications for a wide variety of labour 
market issues. One area of study focuses on the impact of technological change on wage 
inequality, particularly the wage differential between university and high school 
graduates. It has been well documented (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993) that the 
substantial increase in wage inequality for U.S. males since the 1970s is largely due to 
the divergence in earnings between skilled and unskilled workers. A possible explanation 
is that technological innovations have been skill-biased over the past several decades. 
This, in turn, leads to a sharp increase in the return to education as the relative demand 
for high-skilled labour accelerates. Results in Acemoglu (2002) and Autor, Katz, and 
Krueger (1998) are consistent with this view. 
Yet, the existing literature provides limited evidence of a link between 
technological change and the wage structure in Canada. In contrast to the widening trend 
in the United States, aggregate studies (e.g., Murphy, Riddell, and Romer 1998;  
Burbidge, Magee, and Robb 2002) show that the education premium in Canada has been 
relatively flat since the early 1980s. Beaudry and Green (2000) also find that the skill 
premium does little to explain overall wage inequality in Canada between 1971 and 1993. 
Although technology appears to have had very little impact on changes in the education 
premium at the aggregate level in Canada, it could have important implications for inter-
industry wage differentials. Considering the anecdotal evidence that technological 
innovations are skewed towards certain sectors, the skill-biased labour-demand   2 
hypothesis implies that high-tech sectors would pay higher wages to their workers. For 
instance, Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and Allen (2001) find a positive relationship 
between technological change and inter-industry education premium differentials in the 
United States. The wage gap between high school and college graduates increases in 
industries that have higher research and development (R&D) intensity and capital-labour 
ratios. 
Our main goal is to describe some of the first empirical evidence of the link 
between technology and the education premium and how it differs across industries in 
Canada. Using microdata from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), we begin by documenting the aggregate pattern of the education 
premium between 1981 and 2000. We exploit the richness of the microdata to control for 
changes in the composition of the workforce that might be reflected in some measures of 
the university–high school wage gap. To identify the effects of technology on skill 
premiums, the analysis relies mainly on inter-industry variations. We are able to construct 
a panel of 10 sectors for the period 1981–97 using the SCF. More disaggregated data 
from the LFS allow us to look separately at 29 industries from 1997 to 2000. There are 
two advantages to extending the aggregate analysis to the industry level. First, in addition 
to year-to-year variations, it is possible to identify the effects of technological change on 
education premiums using inter-industry variations. Second, the extension allows us to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across industries in a fixed-effects framework. In 
addition, this study proposes a wide range of technology indicators, including multi-
factor productivity, the ratio of R&D expenditure to output, the percentage of 
employment engaged in R&D, and the ratio of scientists and engineers to total 
employment. 
  Our aggregate results are consistent with those of previous studies of Canada. The 
education premium has remained fairly constant between 1981 and 2000. While different 
age groups (young vs. old) might have experienced different patterns, the differences are 
small, particularly when compared with the outcomes witnessed in the United States. 
More importantly, we find that the education premium is significantly different across 
industries.  These observed differentials, however, are associated with the composition of 
workers’ occupations, but not with the technological change in industry. At first glance,   3 
R&D-intensive industries tend to pay their workers a higher education premium. This 
positive correlation is mainly explained by the fact that a larger share of their workforce  
are professionals, such as scientists and engineers.
1 It is not surprising that a higher ratio 
of professionals leads to a wider wage gap, because they are better paid than the average 
university graduate. These aggregate and sectoral findings are not to say that recent 
technology innovations have no impact on the relative demand of skilled workers and the 
relative wage structure. The skill-biased demand hypothesis can be reconciled by the 
equalizing movements from the supply side. That is, a rise in the demand for skills as a 
result of technological innovations has been offset by a corresponding increase in supply. 
There is aggregate evidence that both the relative demand and supply of skilled workers 
have followed a steady growth pattern as proxied by a linear time trend over the past two 
decades. In other words, this result does not support the general perception that the rate of 
increase in skill-biased demand accelerated in the second half of the 1990s. 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a theoretical framework in 
which the skill premium is determined by the relative demand and supply of skilled 
labour. Section 3 describes some data issues. Section 4 highlights the aggregate pattern of 
wage differentials between university and high school graduates in Canada over the 
period 1981–2000. In section 5, we exploit variations across industries to examine the 
impact of technological change on skill premiums. Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
 
2.  Simple Theoretical Framework 
To illustrate the link between technological change and the education premium, 
we use a simple model to motivate the analysis in this paper. Following the literature, we 
assume that the aggregate production function is in the form of constant elasticity of 
substitution with two types of labour: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
r r r q q
/ 1
t lt t ht t L H Y + = .  (1) 
                                                                   
1 For a detailed definition of professionals, see footnote 28.   4 
The aggregate output in time t, Yt, is a function of skilled (Ht) and unskilled (Lt) labour 
and the corresponding technology efficiency parameters ?ht and ?lt, and ? = 1–1/t, where 
t is the elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups.
2 
We can solve for the equilibrium relative wages by equating wages to the 
marginal product of each skill group. In this simple framework, the observed university–
high school wage gap at time t (wht / wlt) is determined by two factors: the aggregate 
relative supply of university-educated workers (Ht / Lt) and the skill-biased technology 
shock (?ht / ?lt).  The relative wages in log is then given by3: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t lt ht lt ht L H w w / log 1 / log / log r q q r - - = .  (2) 
Intuitively, an increase in the relative supply of educated workers reduces the skill 
premium, while improvements in technology have a positive effect.
4 Therefore, if 
technology is advancing at a faster rate than the aggregate supply of skills, we would 
expect the relative earnings of educated workers to rise over time. 
Considering a multi-sector economy in which technological innovations are 
skewed towards certain sectors, the average wage gap in equation (2) provides little 
guidance to predict the industry profiles. To illustrate this point, we assume a simple 
economy with two sectors: a new (N) and a traditional (T) economy. Extending the 
aggregate model, the university–high school wage gap in sector j at time t can be written 
as: 
  j t t j lt ht j lt ht L H w w ) / log( ) 1 ( ) / log( ) / log( r q q r - - = ;
5     j = N, T.  (3a) 
Hence, the skill premium differential between the new and traditional sectors is 
determined by the difference in their skill-biased technology and relative supply of 
educated workers, 
                                                                   
2 We maintain the hypothesis of perfect substitution across different age groups with the same skill level. 
This has implications for the university–high school wage gap for different age groups. We briefly discuss 
this in our empirical analysis. See also Card and Lemieux (2001).  
3 For a more detailed exposition of the model, see Acemoglu (2002). 
4 This assumes that skilled and unskilled workers are gross substitutes; i.e., t  > 1 (0 < ? < 1). Most 
empirical studies (e.g., Freeman 1986) find t between 1 and 2.  
5 The elasticity of substitution (?) is the same for both sectors. This assumption simplifies the notation in 
equation (3b). Allowing ? to vary across sectors does not change the main results that follow. 























r - - = .  (3b) 
By definition, skilled workers are relatively more productive in the new economy 
sector; i.e., (?ht / ?lt )N  > (?ht / ?lt)T. This implies that the first term of equation (3b) is  







means that the relative demand for high-
skilled workers in sector N is greater than it is in sector T. 
The industry supply of skilled workers depends on the flexibility of the labour 
market. In general, the stronger demand of skills in the new economy sector attracts 
labour from the traditional sector. In the extreme case with perfect mobility, high-skilled 
workers are homogeneous and free to move between sectors. This reallocation process 
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In contrast, if it takes time for high-skilled workers to move between sectors, owing to 
industry-specific human capital, the education premium differential persists between the 
new economy and the traditional sector until the labour supply is fully adjusted.  The 
assumption of imperfect mobility does not necessarily imply a higher education premium 
in the high-tech sectors. Skilled workers in sector N are better paid than those in sector T 



























                                                                   


























. In other 
words, there is an “excess” supply of educated workers in the high-tech sector, who depress the skill 
premium .   6 
3.  Data 
To study the wage trends in Canada, the best available source is the SCF, 
published annually since the early 1980s.
7 It uses the monthly LFS sampling frame and 
collects income information in the spring of each year. While a survey wage rate is not 
available in the SCF, we can construct average weekly earning series using information  
on annual earnings and weeks worked in the reference year. The disadvantage in using 
SCF is that it was discontinued in 1997. As an alternative to the SCF, the revised LFS is a 
good source of wage data starting from 1997.
8 Unlike the SCF, the sequence of wage 
questions in the LFS begins by asking about the hourly rate of pay for those who are 
hourly-rated. For others, the respondents are asked to report the easiest pay period; their 
wages are then converted to an hourly rate by dividing the reported wage by the usual 
hours of work in the same time period. We combine the years available from the SCF 
with the post-1997 years from the LFS to construct 19 annual cross sections of data that 
cover the years 1981 to 2000. The sample is restricted to workers between the ages of 24 
and 65 with reported weekly earnings above $100.  
The micro-level data do not provide any information on the technological 
progress of the industry in which the individual works. We therefore have to match the 
data with some industry measures of technological change from other sources. In the 
remainder of this section, we address two important issues in the wage data: the 
differences between and similarities among the SCF and LFS, and the changes in the 
information collection on education and consequently the coding of education over time.  
We also describe the sources and measures that we use for technological change. 
3.1  Education groups 
Table 1 describes, by year, the shares of the education groups in both data sets. 
One major concern using the SCF data arises from the changes in the definitions of 
                                                                   
7 Census family files are also available for 1973, 1975, 1977, and 1979.  To create a series consistent with 
the post-1981 individual files, however, the sample should be restricted to heads of households.  Because 
the purpose of this paper is to consider changes to the wage gap in recent years, we do not include the 
earlier years from the family files, and consequently do not make the restrictions to heads of households. 
8 The LFS underwent a major revision in 1997 that involved, among others, adding questions about wages  
on a monthly basis.   7 
education categories in 1989. At that time, Statistics Canada switched from a notion of 
completion of years of schooling to a notion of attainment of schooling and began to code 
education outside of schools (e.g., trades certificates) in new ways.  Prior to 1989, 
individuals who earned a certificate from a program that did not require a high school 
diploma were categorized as having a high school education, whereas, after 1989, those 
individuals were categorized as having a post-secondary certificate. The two main 
education groups of interest in this study are: (i) those with some or a complete high 
school education, and (ii) those with one university degree or more. The first group  
includes individuals who have some post-secondary education but no post-secondary 
certificate or degree. Although the 1989 change in the definition does not affect those 
with a university degree, it does alter the composition of those assigned to the high school 
group. This change is expected to cause a drop in the average earnings of the less-
educated group after 1989, since the recoding removes more-educated (skilled) people 
from the high school group. The direction of the bias is particularly important, since the 
hypothesis we will be testing is whether an increase in the university–high school wage 
gap occurred in recent years. This issue plays a significant role in interpreting the 
aggregate pattern of the wage gap in Canada in section 4. 
3.2  The SCF vs. the LFS 
In 1997, the two surveys were conducted separately. The availability of data from 
them allows us to evaluate the extent to which the LFS constitutes a good alternative (or 
extension) of the SCF. Using regression analysis and a simple human capital model of 
earnings, we argue that the two surveys can be treated as substitutes for some purposes, 
including the return-to-education issues studied in this paper. We start by estimating the 
following human capital model using separate data sets (SCF and LFS): 
  i i i i u EDUC X w + + = d b ) log( .  (4) 
Weekly earnings, Wi, are derived from the annual earnings and weeks of work in 
the SCF and from the wage rate and the hours of work in the LFS. X is a set of exogenous 
variables including age, gender, marital status, province of residence, and industry   8 
association.9 EDUC is a set of five education dummies that corresponds to the following 
education groups: 0 to 8 years of schooling, some secondary education, high school 
education (as defined in section 3.1), post-secondary certificate or diploma, and 
university education. The estimation samples are limited to individuals who earned at 
least $100 per week, were not self-employed, and were between 20 and 64 years old in 
1997. The parameters of interest in equation (4) are the d’s.  We estimate these 
parameters separately in the two samples using simple weighted least-square methods. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show the results of this exercise. The excluded category in 
the estimation is the university graduates, so the parameter estimates are the earning 
differences between each education category and the university graduates, controlling for 
other exogenous factors included in X.
10  As expected, the education wage differentials 
are significant in each sample. Workers with less than eight years of schooling earn 
around 52 per cent less than university graduates. This gap decreases to between 32 and 
34 per cent for high school graduates. As the level of education continues to increase, 
wages rise steadily and the gap with university wages decreases.  Table 2 also shows that 
the point estimates of the education dummies are remarkably similar across the two 
samples, but somewhat smaller in the LFS sample. 
To test how different these estimated parameters are, we combine the two samples 
and create a dummy variable (DLFS) equal to one if an observation is drawn from the LFS 
sample, and equal to zero if an observation is drawn from the SCF sample. We then allow 
interactions between DLFS and the education dummies, EDUCi.  In column 4 of Table 2, 
we report the t-statistics of each interaction term separately. In all cases except one, the 
interaction term is not statistically significant in the two samples.  The last column, 
however, shows that a joint test rejects the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in 
education differentials between the SCF and LFS. If we restrict our attention to the 
university–high school wage gap, the t-test in this case supports the null. These results 
suggest that the university–high school wage gap is consistently measured in the two 
                                                                   
9 The SCF does not provide direct information on the number of hours worked by week in the reference 
year. We have computed a measure of actual hours worked per week by detailed category of worker, using 
the monthly microdata files from the LFS from 1981 to 1997. We use this proxy measure as an additional 
explanatory variable to construct our regression-adjusted wage measure. 
10 For brevity, the estimates of b are not reported. Full results can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.   9 
samples, and they therefore support our strategy of merging the two samples to construct 
a longer time series for the university–high school earning differentials. 
3.3  Technological change 
There is no consensus in the existing literature on the appropriate proxy for 
technological change. Our focus is on the level of skill bias. In general, indicators of 
technological innovations can be categorized into output-based or input-based measures. 
A common output-based measure is multi-factor productivity (MFP), which refers to the 
increase in output relative to the increase in a bundle of inputs. Hence, a technological 
improvement is interpreted as the ability to produce more output with the same amount of 
inputs. This residual measure is often controversial because of the complexity in 
measuring the growth rates of the inputs, particularly the capital stocks. Recent literature 
(e.g., Macgee and Yu 2000) finds that MFP not only captures movements in technology, 
but also variations in capacity utilization over the business cycle. Alternatively, an input-
based technological change can be measured by the extent to which a firm adopts new 
technology in the workplace, such as the amount of their R&D and investment in 
computers.  
  This study uses one output-based and three input-based measures of technological 
change: (i) MFP growth, (ii) the ratio of R&D expenditure to output, (iii) the percentage 
of employment engaged in R&D, and (iv) the ratio of scientists and engineers to total 
employment calculated from the sample. Appendix A gives a detailed definition of each 
measure. 
To check whether there is any overlap between these technology measures, Table 
3 presents the correlation matrix. Panel A examines the contemporaneous relationship for 
the period 1981–97 in 10 sectors.
11 There is a lot of overlap between input-based  
measures. In particular, R&D expenditure is almost perfectly correlated with R&D 
employment. Nevertheless, MFP growth seems to be independent and it is not correlated 
with any of the input-based measures. A possible explanation is the cyclicality of MFP 
growth, as noted above. Another possibility is that the full benefits of R&D activities may 
not be realized in the current year. To explore the possible time lags between R&D and 
                                                                   
11 For a detailed description of each sector, see the SCF classifications in Appendix B.   10 
productivity growth, we test whether the 3-year and 5-year moving averages of different 
technology measures are correlated. Results are reported in panels B and C. As shown in 
the first column, including these lag structures marginally improves the correlation 
between MFP growth and the input-based measures. Yet, all coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, except the one between the 5-year moving average of MFP growth and the 
ratio of scientists and engineers. Therefore, sectors with strong MFP growth do not 
necessarily have high R&D expenditure or employment. These results suggest that each 
indicator is likely to capture some aspects of the technological change and no particular 
one is considered the ideal measure.  
 
4.  Overview of the Aggregate Pattern 
We are now ready to summarize some of the aggregate patterns in the wage 
differences between university and high school graduates. One measure of this wage 
differential is simply the difference between the average wages of high school graduates 
and the average wages of university graduates in a given year.  Such a measure, however, 
does not account for the distribution of workers’ characteristics over different education 
groupings. Given the richness of the microdata, we suggest a regression-adjusted measure 
for the education gap.  Formally, we estimate equation (4) in repeated annual cross 
sections for the years 1981 to 2000. The excluded education group is the university 
graduates, so we interpret the estimated coefficient of the high school dummy variable, dt, 
as our regression-adjusted measure of the university–high school wage differential in 
year t.  
Figure 1 shows the unadjusted wage gap between high school and university 
graduates, as well the regression-adjusted gap { }
2000
1981 ˆ
= t t d . Over the whole sample, the 
unadjusted wage-gap average is 34 per cent. It rose by six percentage points during the 
sample period. Controlling for the observable characteristics of the workers, this 
estimated differential turns out to be less than the measured one, averaging 32 per cent 
over the sample period. The growth in this series is not as pronounced, either. Fitting a 
linear trend to the series shows a slightly positive slope. As discussed in the data section, 
some of this growth might be caused by the change in the education definition in 1989. In   11 
fact, if we regress the wage series on a time trend and a 1989 dummy, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the 1989 dummy explains the increase in the wage series.  Also note 
that the relative wage gap seems stable throughout the second half of the 1990s, a period 
thought to have experienced substantial technological growth in some sectors of the 
Canadian economy. 
We use the theoretic framework described in section 2 to guide us in interpreting 
this stable pattern. As suggested in equation (3a), the movement in relative wages should 
reflect the relative supply and demand conditions. Considering the difficulty of obtaining 
a correct measure of skill-biased technology, we begin our analysis by measuring the  
relative labour supply in the domestic market.
12 Following the literature, we map each 
skill type to an equivalent education category. We consider two education groups: 
“university equivalent” workers and “high school” equivalent workers. Workers with a 
high school degree supply one high school equivalent, and workers with a university 
degree supply one university equivalent. Those with less than a high school education 
supply a fraction of a high school equivalent, and workers with some post-secondary 
education are divided between the high school and university equivalent.13  
Figure 2 shows that the relative supply of university graduates remained at the 
same level until 1988 before it started to trend upward throughout the 1990s. One could 
approximate the supply of skills in Canada by a constant trend over the past two decades. 
Furthermore, the steady growth rate of over 5 per cent per year is much higher than the  
estimates in the U.S. studies based on similar methods. Card and DiNardo (2002) find 
that the relative supply of U.S. college-educated workers followed a linear trend of only  
2 per cent between 1982 and 2000. As Murphy, Riddell, and Romer (1998) point out, 
although both the United States and Canada are affected by a similar skill-biased 
technological change, the absence of a rise in the wage premium to Canadian university 
                                                                   
12 We do not control for external factors affecting the supply of skills. For example, international trade 
undoubtedly has an important effect on the relative supply. It has been well documented that the North 
American market has become much more integrated after the free trade agreement. Considering the case 
that Canada imports relatively skill-intensive products from the United States, this is equivalent to 
importing high-skilled workers into the Canadian labour market. This simple example illustrates the fact 
that a stronger trade linkage with the United States can imply an increase in the supply of skills.
  
13A worker with less than a high school degree is assumed to supply 95 per cent of a high school-equivalent 
labour supply, while labour supplied by a worker with a post-secondary certificate or diploma is assumed to 
be equally divided between high school-equivalent labour and university-equivalent labour. 
   12 
graduates can be explained by a faster growth in the supply of workers who have a post-
secondary education. 
Given the labour supply and the observed wage gap described above, it is possible 
to draw some conclusions about the evolution of skill-biased demand shocks. The 
virtually constant wage premium implies that the demand and the supply follow the same 
pattern. To check whether a linear trend is a reasonable proxy for the skill-biased 
technological change between 1981 and 2000 in Canada, Figure 3 presents four 
commonly used aggregate measures of technological change14: (i) percentage of total 
business investment in computers and software, (ii) ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP, 
(iii) percentage of scientists and engineers, and (iv) MFP growth. An upward linear trend 
appears to fit well in three of the measures, especially for computer investment and R&D 
expenditure.
15 In sum, as opposed to a period commonly thought to have experienced an 
acceleration of technological advancements, these findings suggest that the skill-biased 
demand continued to grow at a steady rate in the late 1990s in Canada. The only 
exception is MFP growth, which exhibits strong volatility. On average, the MFP growth 
was less than 0.05 per cent during the 1981–90 period and it increased to 0.8 per cent 
between 1991 and 2000.  
One dimension along which the university–high school premium might differ is 
age. In fact, Card and Lemieux (2001) show that a model where skills of young and old 
workers are not perfect substitutes in production is supported by data from the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The evidence for Canada, using census data for 
1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995, shows that the wage gap for 26- to 30-year-old men 
increased around 50 per cent at a time when the gap for 46- to 60-year-old men decreased 
almost 30 per cent. We find similar results in our annual data. Figure 4 shows that the 
education premiums for young and old workers have opposing trends. While the decrease 
in the education gap for the old could be explained by the acceleration in the relative 
supply of university-educated labour (Figure 5), the upward trend in the education gap for 
                                                                   
14 All measures are in logs.  
15 For these two technology measures, a fitted linear trend can explain more than 90 per cent of the 
variations between 1981 and 2000. 
   13 
young workers might be taken as some evidence that skill-biased technological shock 
favours them.  
 
5.  Industrial Analysis 
Our aggregate results show that the skill premium in Canada has been relatively 
flat since the early 1980s. As noted in section 2, this aggregate pattern can have very 
different implications for the industry profiles, depending on the flexibility of the labour 
market. In an economy with different degrees of skill bias across sectors, perfect labour 
mobility would eliminate the inter-industry wage differentials for workers of comparable 
skill levels. Therefore, movements in the skill premium within each industry are similar 
to the aggregate pattern. As long as the total supply of skilled workers catches up with the  
overall rate of technological change, we would expect the skill premium to be steady in 
all sectors. In contrast, imperfect labour mobility has the opposite prediction. The 
university–high school wage gap would exhibit divergent patterns across industries. It 
increases in sectors with rapid technological change. To keep the skill premium constant 
at the aggregate level, this has to be offset by a reduction in low-tech sectors. This 
implies an “excess” supply of skilled workers in low-tech sectors. In this section, we 
extend our aggregate analysis to examine variations across industries. The main focus is 
on whether the skill premium follows different patterns across sectors and how it relates 
to the pace of technological advancement. 
To examine variations of the education premium across sectors, we allow the 
parameter d in equation (4) to differ across industries. Another way to consider this 
modification is that we allow the inter-industry wage differentials to vary across 
education groups.
16 Formally, we use the same regression-adjusted measure for the 
education gap by estimating the following regression in repeated annual cross sections for 
the years 1981–2000: 
  . 1 ; 2000 1981 ; ) log( J j t u EDUC X w ijt ijt jt ijt t ijt K K = = + + = d b   (5) 
                                                                   
16 In equation (4), the average inter-industry wage differentials for all workers are reflected in the industry 
dummies in X.   14 
The variables in the above model are as described in equation (4), defined for J separate 
industries. The number of industries is 10 for the SCF sample between 1981 and 1997, 
and 29 for the LFS sample between 1997 and 2000. The coefficient, djt, represents the log 
of the wage gap between university and high school graduates, for industry j in year t, 
adjusted for the observable characteristics of the workers. 
To examine the existence of a positive relationship between the education 
premium and technology, we consider the following linear specification: 
  ( ) jt t t jt j jt Year Tech e j m a d + + + = log ˆ .  (6) 
The education premium, djt, is the estimated coefficient from equation (5); aj is 
the industry fixed effects. As noted in section 3, various technology indicators (Techjt) are 
proxies for the skill-biased technology of industry j. Dummy variable Yeart is the year 
effects that capture aggregate movements over time; for example, changes in the 
aggregate supply of university-educated workers.  
5.1  SCF (1981–97)  
The adjusted education premium, djt, for each of the 10 sectors17 in the SCF 
sample is plotted in Figure 6 for the period 1981–97. From casual observation, the wage 
gap between university and high school graduates is positive in most sectors, except in 
construction. The t statistics (not reported) show that over 93 per cent of the estimated 
wage gap is statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent confidence level. For ease of 
comparison between sectors, column 2 of Table 4 reports the average university–high 
school wage gap, calculated as the mean estimates from 16 regressions for the years 
1981–97. Excluding a minimum of 10 per cent in construction and a maximum of 44 per 
cent in “other services,” the average wage gaps in the other eight sectors are in the range 
of 22 per cent to 30 per cent. Another interesting pattern, shown in Figure 6, is that the 
sectoral profiles are relatively flat. In spite of the year-over-year fluctuations, the 
education premium has had very little upward movement over the sample period in most 
sectors. At a 5 per cent confidence level, fitted time trends (not shown in Figure 6) in 
                                                                   
17 For a detailed definition of each sector, see Appendix B. 
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only two sectors are significantly different from zero. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 
compare the average return of university education for the periods before and after 1990. 
The only two sectors with more than a 5 per cent increase are retail and FIRE (finance, 
insurance, and real estate). 
  Table 5 reports the sectoral means of different technology indicators for the 1981–
97 period, and for two subperiods, 1981–89 and 1990–97. The first observation is a 
considerable dispersion in the level of technology across sectors. For example, the 
average MFP growth between 1981 and 1997 (column 4) is negative in three sectors 
(construction, FIRE, and other services), while the agriculture sector experiences a 
growth rate of 2 per cent. The ratio of R&D expenditure to output (column 7) ranges 
from close to 0 per cent in construction and retail to 6 per cent in durable manufacturing. 
Similarly, substantial variations across sectors are evident for the other two technology 
measures. As noted earlier in the correlation matrix, it is not easy to find a consistent 
identification of high-tech sectors based on various indicators. In particular, output- and 
input-based measures can have very different predictions for the rate of technological 
change. Agriculture, with the highest level of MFP growth, ranks very low in R&D 
intensity. In contrast, other services have the lowest MFP growth, but relatively high 
values in output-based measures. There are exceptions in two sectors with relatively 
stable rankings. Consistent with the general perception of the high-tech sector, durable 
manufacturing always ranks among the top in all four indicators. Construction seems to 
be the loser in technological innovations. 
  We next examine the central issue of whether the return from a university degree 
is better in high-tech sectors. Using different proxies for the technological change, the 
estimated coefficients of the main variable of interest, µ in equation (6), are reported in 
Table 6. We begin with the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, which assumes that 
ai is the same across sectors. As shown in column 1, most estimates are positive and  
significant. To check whether heteroscedasticity affects the inference on OLS, column 2 
presents the corrected standard errors suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
18 
We also report the generalized least squares (GLS) estimates assuming groupwise 
                                                                   
18 Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) argue that t-ratios for normal White corrected standard errors are too 
large for small samples.    16 
heteroscedasticity in column 3.19 These two modified estimation procedures provide 
results similar to the OLS. Overall, there is some evidence that high-tech sectors pay a 
higher skill premium to their workers.
20  
As noted in equation (3b), perhaps the major concern of the OLS results would be 
the missing relative supply of skilled workers. If the supply is indeed exogenous and 
unrelated to the technological change, the estimates of µ are unbiased. One way to check 
for potential omitted variable bias is to exploit the panel nature of the data and estimate  
first-differenced and fixed-effects (FE) model.21 Considering the case when skilled 
workers are somewhat mobile across sectors, they will move from the low-tech to high-
tech sectors in response to incipient pressures for the increase in the education premium. 
Therefore, skilled workers are more concentrated in high-tech industries that have rapid 
technological advancements. This positive correlation between technology and the supply 
of skills would bias the OLS results towards zero. We expect the estimates of µ to be 
greater in FE estimations. 
Surprisingly, the first-differenced and FE estimates in columns 4 and 5, 
respectively, of Table 6 provide the opposite picture. Compared with the positive OLS 
estimates in columns 1 to 3, most estimates are smaller and become virtually zero. Also, 
the standard errors
22 are much larger than the estimates. One might argue that this is 
caused by a measurement error. The FE results are contaminated when the technology 
proxies are badly measured.
23 To check for a measurement error, we compute the 
                                                                   

























20 For the long-term dynamics, we have replicated the analysis with lags on technological change up to t-2 
in the specifications. The basic results (not reported) are similar to those reported in Table 6. The F- 
statistics reject the null hypothesis that the sum of technology coefficients is zero for all technology 
proxies, except the MFP growth.
  
21 The underlying assumption is that the level of the supply of skills is sector-specific, but fixed over time. 
A less restrictive interpretation is that changes in the labour supply from year to year within an industry are 
small relative to the inter-industry differentials. 
22 Corrected standard errors using the procedure in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) are shown in columns 
4 and 5 of Table 6. 
23 To illustrate this point in a simple example, we assume that the technology proxy measures the industry 
skill bias with white-noise errors; i.e., log(Techjt) = log(?ht/?lt)j + ?jt, where (?ht/?lt)j is growing at a constant 
rate, ? j. If ? j is small relative to the variance of ?jt, first-differencing the data or FE estimations would 
magnify the measurement error (Griliches and Hausman 1986). 
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Hausman specification test by instrumenting the technology proxies with their last-period 
values. The Wald statistics for all four proxies are either very small or negative. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no measurement error.  
How do we interpret the difference between the OLS and FE results in a demand- 
and-supply framework? The technology impact on the skill premium is zero after 
controlling for the supply of skills in the FE model. Hence, the positive OLS estimates 
are completely driven by sectoral differences in the relative supply. This implies an 
inverse correlation between technology and the supply of skills. In other words, the 
portion of skilled workers in low-tech sectors is higher than that in high-tech sectors. This 
counterintuitive explanation is easily rejected when we look at the sample correlation 
between technology and the share of university graduates in different sectors. The 
correlation coefficients between the ratio of university to high school equivalent and 
various technology measures are statistically insignificant. A more plausible explanation  
of the divergent results is that the fixed effects capture some “unobserved” sector 
characteristics unrelated to the supply of educated workers. Thus, the observed positive 
correlation between the education premium and technology from the OLS models reflects 
some permanent inter-industry differentials other than technology. We will further 
discuss the possibilities of these unobserved factors in section 5.3. 
  Another common argument is that firms may have behaved differently between 
the 1980s and 1990s. It is possible that technological innovations not only have an impact 
on the level of skill bias, but also on the substitutability between skilled and unskilled 
workers. As noted in the theoretical framework described in section 2, changes in the 
elasticity of substitution (t) affect the response of skill premiums to technology. To 
evaluate this hypothesis, we repeat the same analysis in Table 7 by interacting the 
technology measure with the dummy variable, Yr90, which equals 1 for the post-1990  
period. Surprisingly, there is no observable difference between the two subperiods, as 
shown by the statistically insignificant effect of the interaction terms. 
5.2  LFS (1997–2000) 
The SCF results are subject to several criticisms.  First, the industry analysis relies 
mainly on cross-section variations that might be averaged out in the high level of   18 
aggregation with only 10 sectors. With the recent revolution in information and 
communications technologies (ICT), one would expect industries with heavy use or 
production of ICT, such as the electrical and electronic products sector, to have the fastest 
rate of technological change. Yet, the durable manufacturing sector also includes other 
traditional industries, such as wood, furniture, and primary metal. Second, the SCF data 
end in 1997 and do not cover the late 1990s, a period thought to have experienced a rapid 
acceleration in technological progress. Third, the university–high school wage gap in the 
SCF sample refers to the difference in their weekly earnings. Although we include a 
control of average weekly hours based on age, gender, province, and year, it does not 
take into account the differences across industries. 
To address these issues, we replicate the exercise by using the LFS data for a 
more recent period, 1997–2000.
24  The main advantage of the LFS is that it provides a 
more detailed breakdown of industries, especially in the manufacturing sector. This 
enables us to further separate durable and non-durable manufacturing into 17 industries, 
including some of the so-called “new economy” industries, such as computer and 
electronic products, and electrical equipment, appliances, and components. With other 
industries in the primary sector, construction, and services, we have a total of 29 industry 
groups.
25 Furthermore, as stated in section 3, the wage gap can be measured in hourly 
rates that are directly reported in the LFS. The sample is then restricted to workers with 
reported hourly wages of between $2 and $200, since observations outside that range 
likely result from measurement error.  
We re-estimate equation (5) using the LFS sample. Table 8 shows the estimated 
university–high school wage gap of each industry over the period 1997–2000. The mean 
in column 5 ranges from a minimum of 3 per cent in fishing, hunting, and trapping to a 
maximum of 47 per cent in computer and electronic products manufacturing. More 
importantly, we observe a substantial dispersion within the manufacturing sector. For 
durable goods, the skill premium for workers in non-metallic mineral products is only   
23 per cent, compared with 34 per cent in primary metals; 36 per cent in electrical 
                                                                   
24 In principle, we can combine the LFS with the SCF. However, the change in the industry grouping from 
SIC to the North America Industry Classification System (NAICS) prevents us from merging the two data 
sets at the industry level. 
25 For details of each industry, see Appendix A.   19 
equipment, appliances, and components; and 47 per cent in computer and electronic 
products. A divergent pattern is also found in non-durable manufacturing. The wage gap 
for textiles, paper, printing, and petroleum and coal is about 25 per cent, but it increases 
to 38 per cent for food, beverages, and tobacco, and chemical and pharmaceutical 
products. 
Table 9 reports the means of three technology indicators for different industries
26 
for 1997–2000. The most prominent result is that R&D intensity is concentrated in one 
industry: the manufacture of computer and electronic products. Its ratio of R&D 
expenditure to output is 31 per cent, which is five times above the ratio in two other 
leading industries: chemical and pharmaceutical products (5.7 per cent) and 
transportation equipment (5.3 per cent). On average, 24 per cent of the workforce in 
computer and electronic products are engaged in R&D, while most of the industries 
remain at a level below 1 per cent. Compared with Tables 4 and 5, the results in Tables 8 
and 9 highlight the diversity within sectors. The lower level of industry aggregation 
provides more cross-sectional variations with which to identify the effects of technology 
on the education premium. 
Table 10 reports the re-estimation results for equation (6).  The OLS estimates in 
column 1 indicate a positive and statistically significant correlation between the 
education premium and the technology. Yet, the positive OLS disappears after 
controlling for industry fixed effects. FE estimates in column 2 do not significantly differ 
from zero.
27 These results are remarkably similar to the SCF results reported in Table 7. 
The divergence between the OLS and FE estimates again suggests that the higher 
education premium in high-tech industries is driven by unobserved industry 
characteristics unrelated to the technology used in the industry. 
5.3  Unobserved industry characteristics 
It is interesting to investigate which unobserved factors are the cause of the inter-
industry skill-premium differentials. At least five possibilities can provide a consistent 
explanation for the positive correlation between the education premium and the rate of 
                                                                   
26 MFP data at the industry level using NAICS classifications are not available. 
27 Standard errors in Table 10 are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the procedure described in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).    20 
technological change. First, higher wages in high-tech industries simply reflect rent-
sharing. A number of empirical studies (e.g., Hildreth and Oswald 1997) suggest that 
workers’ compensation is partly related to a firm’s financial performance. If the adoption 
of new technologies has a positive impact on the profitability of firms (e.g., Stoneman 
and Kwon 1996), the higher education premium in R&D-intensive industries can be the 
result of profit-sharing for skilled workers.  
Second, the competitiveness of the industry partly explains the inter-industry 
differentials in the return to education. A common argument is that productivity gains in 
a highly competitive industry are mainly reflected in the price reduction of the product. 
Firms, therefore, have limited room to raise wages for their increasingly productive 
workers. If the high-tech markets are oligopolistic, high profit margins allow firms to 
widen the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.  
Third, labour market institutions, such as union coverage, have an important 
effect on the distribution of wages. Hirsch (1982) shows that, in the United States, there 
is significantly less wage dispersion in the union than in the non-union sectors. Lemieux 
(1993) finds similar results for Canada. If a lower percentage of workers in high-tech 
industries are covered by collective bargaining, this implies a wider wage dispersion.  
Fourth, it has been well documented in the literature that firm size plays a crucial 
role in explaining inter-industry wage differentials. One possible explanation is that large 
firms are more willing to adopt advanced technology (e.g., Earl 2002). In this case, firm 
size partly captures the technology effects on skill premiums. Another explanation is that 
skilled workers in large firms are more productive due to better opportunities for 
continuous training (e.g., Black, Noel, and Wang 1999).  
Fifth, Bartel and Sicherman (1999) point out that sorting based on workers’ 
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for most of the observed higher education premium in 
high-tech industries.  We are unable to address this issue, however, because of data 
limitations. The LFS is not an individual-level panel data set and we cannot formally 
control for workers’ unobserved abilities. Instead, professional status to a certain extent 
reflects an individual’s ability that is not captured in the return to education. As long as 
wages measure the productivity of workers, it is not surprising that the average income of   21 
a professional, such as an accountant or a lawyer, is higher than that of an average 
university graduate. 
To examine the role played by these five factors in explaining the inter-industry 
differentials in the return to education, we introduce additional explanatory variables (Es) 
into equation (6). That is, 
  ( ) jt t t
s
sjt s jt jt Year E Tech e j l m a d + + + + = ￿ log ˆ .  (7) 
The variables in Esjt refer to: (i) the profit margin, measured as the ratio of the 
operating profit to the operating revenue, (ii) the growth rate of the operating profit, (iii) 
the percentage of workers covered by collective agreements, (iv) the percentage of 
workers in firms with more than 100 employees, and (v) the percentage of professionals28 
of industry j at time t. These five variables are intended to capture the effects of the 
product’s market-competitiveness, financial performance, union density, firm size, and 
workers’ ability on the education premium. 
Using the LFS sample, we begin with the OLS results as shown in column 3 of 
Table 10. The most important message is that the inclusion of explanatory variables, Es, 
reduces the technology effects on the education premium. Compared with the OLS 
results in column 1, even though the estimates on R&D expenditure and employment are 
still positive, they are smaller in magnitude and insignificantly different from zero. Also, 
all estimates of ?s are statistically insignificant, except the percentage of professionals. 
this is some indication that the industry fixed effects in column 2 capture the “permanent” 
differentials in the composition of workers’ occupations. This result also suggests that 
R&D activities are concentrated in industries that have a relatively high proportion of 
professionals in their workforce. The FE estimates are reported in the last column, for 
comparison with the OLS.  The insignificant results are probably due to the lack of year-
to-year variation29 in most variables over the short panel of four years.  
 
                                                                   
28 Professionals include managers; professional occupations in business and finance, natural and applied 
sciences, health, art, and culture; registered nurses; judges; lawyers; psychologists; social workers; 
ministers of religion; policy and program officers; teachers and professors. 
29 As noted earlier, this can be viewed as a measurement error.   22 
6.  Conclusion 
Compared with the United States, the education premium in Canada has remained 
relatively flat over the past two decades. Our aggregate analysis shows that the rising 
demand for skilled workers as a result of skill-biased technological change is offset by a 
substantial increase in the supply of workers who have a post-secondary education. 
Furthermore, we find that the relative supply of these workers grew at a steady pace for 
the entire 1990s. Combined with the stable wage pattern, this result does not support the 
general perception that there has been an acceleration in the growth of skill-biased 
demand in the 1990s. When the skill premiums for different age groups are examined 
separately, the skill-biased demand hypothesis seems to be in favour of the younger 
generation. However, the wage-gap evolution for young and old workers in Canada 
remains flatter than in the United States.  
Despite the constant aggregate trend, technology could play a crucial role in 
explaining the inter-industry wage differentials. In a multi-sector economy where 
technology innovations are concentrated in certain industries with imperfect labour 
mobility, we would expect a positive relation between the education premium and the 
technology change in industry. Using microdata from the SCF and LFS, we find that 
R&D-intensive industries tend to pay higher skill premiums.  Further investigation, 
however, indicates that this positive correlation mainly reflects differences in the 
composition of workers’ occupations, but not the technological change in industry. It 
turns out that a higher proportion of workers in R&D-intensive industries are 
professionals. Therefore, the wider university–high school wage gap in high-tech 
industries is explained by the fact that professionals are probably better paid than the 
average university graduate.  
This finding is not to say that technological changes have no impact on the 
relative demand of skilled workers and the relative wage structure. The skill-biased 
demand hypothesis can be reconciled by the equalizing movements from the supply side. 
That is, a rise in the demand for skills as a result of technological innovations is offset by 
a corresponding increase in the supply.  Our paper has also shed light on other 
dimensions in explaining the inter-industry wage differentials. Surprisingly, we find no   23 
evidence of profit-sharing, market competition, firm size, and union effects in the wage- 
determination process.  
An important issue for future research is to understand the link between 
technology and the supply of skills. We have focused on the demand side and have 
simply assumed that improvements in technology are exogenous. On the other hand, 
under the assumption of an endogenous skill-bias model, the future path of technology 
advancements is determined by the current supply of skills. Given the rapid expansion in 
education in Canada over the past two decades, we would expect that Canada would 
accelerate in new technologies, but not necessarily become a leading country in R&D.30 
Being a small open economy, Canada does not rely on domestic R&D as the only source 
of innovations. As Gera, Gu, and Lee (1999) point out, R&D spillovers from abroad, 
such as imported investment, are also important for the acquisition of new ideas.  
 
                                                                   
30  In 1999, R&D expenditure was only 1 per cent of Canada`s GDP. This was only half of that in Japan, 
the United States, and Germany, and it ranked in the middle among OECD countries.   24 
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secondary  University 
SCF 
 
         
1981  13.75  14.15  44.36  14.71  13.04 
1982  13.33  13.49  44.67  14.53  13.98 
1984  12.04  12.92  44.79  15.41  14.85 
1985  10.40  12.32  45.52  16.55  15.21 
1986  9.30  12.19  45.76  16.84  15.91 
1987  9.62  11.35  44.90  17.49  16.64 
1988  8.74  11.42  45.42  18.14  16.28 
1989  7.42  10.25  38.68  29.27  14.37 
1990  6.62  10.07  38.94  29.47  14.90 
1991  6.23  8.76  39.58  29.50  15.92 
1992  5.08  7.91  38.62  30.44  17.94 
1993  5.09  8.34  37.28  31.92  17.37 
1994  5.06  7.70  35.91  32.93  18.40 
1995  5.02  7.40  36.21  33.37  18.00 
1996  4.55  6.82  34.22  35.15  19.26 
1997  4.19  6.81  34.35  35.71  18.94 
           
LFS           
           
1997  3.91  11.24  30.36  35.19  19.30 
1998  3.90  10.92  30.04  35.80  19.34 













Notes: Survey of Consumer Finances and the Labour Force Survey. The SCF was not conducted 
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Education Wage Differentials in 1997 
Education  SCF  LFS  t-test  F-test 
p-value 

























-3.731   
        3.94 
0.0034 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions contain other exogenous variables: age, 
gender, marital status, province dummies, and industry dummies. University graduates are the 
excluded category. 
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Table 3: Correlation of Sectoral Technological Change, 1981–97 
  MFP growth  R&D expenditure  R&D persons 
  A. Contemporaneous 
R&D expenditure  0.0195     
R&D persons  0.0551  0.9735*   
% of scientists  -0.0106  0.3462*  0.3636* 
  B. MA(3) 
R&D expenditure  0.0458     
R&D persons  0.0955  0.9769*   
% of scientists  0.1247  0.3445*  0.3666* 
  C. MA(5) 
R&D expenditure  0.0346     
R&D persons  0.1119  0.9807*   
% of scientists  0.1943*  0.3359*  0.3620* 
Notes: * significant at 1 per cent.  MA means moving average.  
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Table 4: Means of OLS Estimates of University–High School Wage Gap  
by Sector, 1981–97 
Industry  1981–97  1981–89  1990–97 
1.  Agriculture   -0.29776  -0.27368  -0.32184 
2.  Other primary  -0.25601  -0.23956  -0.27247 
3.  Manufacturing, non-durables  -0.30546  -0.28703  -0.32389 
4.  Manufacturing, durables  -0.27258  -0.27573  -0.26942 
5.  Construction  -0.10094  -0.07800  -0.12387 
6.  Transportation, communication 
and other utilities 
-0.27357  -0.27157  -0.27557 
7.  Wholesale  -0.25837  -0.27719  -0.23956 
8.  Retail  -0.22471  -0.19913  -0.25029 
9.  FIREª  -0.30066  -0.25634  -0.34499 
10. Other services  -0.44149  -0.42884  -0.45414 
Notes: Regressions are the same as in Table 2, except for the interaction between the education and sector 
dummies. University graduates are the excluded category. Numbers reported are the means of the 
estimates from separate regressions for each of the time periods from 1981 to 1997. 
a: FIRE: Finance, insurance, and real estate 
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Table 5: Means of Measures of Technological Change by Industry, 1981–97 
Industry  MFP growth (%)  R&D expenditure (%)  R&D person (%)  Scientist/engineer (%) 
  81–89  90–97  81–97  81–89  90–97  81–97  81–89  90–97  81–97  81–89  90–97  81–97 
1.  Agriculture   2.12  1.88  2.01  0.17  0.34  0.25  0.19  0.36  0.28  1.23  1.63  1.43 
2.   Other primary  -0.23  1.23  0.46  0.67  0.66  0.66  0.45  0.50  0.48  8.87  7.99  8.43 
3.   Manufacturing, 
non-durables 
0.40  0.43  0.42  1.93  2.17  2.04  0.92  1.02  0.97  2.99  3.42  3.21 
4.   Manufacturing, 
durables 
1.20  0.86  1.04  5.52  6.40  5.96  2.54  3.15  2.84  4.31  5.24  4.78 
5.  Construction  -0.17  -0.27  -0.22  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.04  1.03  0.78  0.91 




1.12  0.71  0.93  0.73  0.69  0.71  0.42  0.37  0.40  3.49  3.95  3.72 
7.  Wholesale  3.01  0.04  1.61  0.36  1.11  0.74  0.25  0.87  0.56  1.46  1.31  1.39 
8.  Retail  0.80  0.14  0.49  0.03  0.09  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.21  0.38  0.30 
9.  FIRE  -1.85  1.13  -0.45  0.14  0.26  0.20  0.19  0.46  0.32  2.35  3.17  2.76 
10. Other services  -1.14  -0.97  -1.06  0.82  1.43  1.12  0.18  0.33  0.25  2.57  3.44  3.00   31 
Table 6: Effects of Technological Change on University–High School Wage Gap, 1981–97 
  OLS  OLS - Robust  GLS  1
st Diff - Robust  FE - Robust 























             










             












             
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies. 
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Table 7: Effects of Technological Change on University–High School Wage Gap, Pre- vs. Post-1990 
  OLS  OLS - Robust  GLS  1
st Diff - Robust  FE - Robust 




















             




















             




















             




















             
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies.   33 
Table 8: Estimates of University–High School Wage Gap by Industry, 1997–2000 
      1997  1998  1999  2000  97-00 
1. Agriculture    -0.148  -0.209  -0.291  -0.296  -0.236 
2. Forestry and logging    -0.237  -0.309  -0.168  -0.200  -0.228 
3. Fishing, hunting, and trapping  -0.179  -0.319  -0.301  0.674  -0.032 
4. Mining and oil and gas extraction  -0.389  -0.358  -0.444  -0.379  -0.393 
5. Utilities 
6. Construction 





12. Petroleum and coal 
13. Chemical and pharmaceutical 
14. Plastics and rubber  
15. Non-metallic mineral  
16. Primary metal 
17. Fabricated metal 
18. Machinery 
19. Computer and electronic 

















































































21. Transportation equipment    -0.308  -0.271  -0.345  -0.312  -0.309 
22. Furniture     -0.171  -0.280  -0.191  -0.333  -0.244 
23. Other manufacturing    -0.432  -0.315  -0.201  -0.325  -0.318 
24. Wholesale    -0.253  -0.325  -0.272  -0.219  -0.267 
25. Retail  -0.235  -0.206  -0.237  -0.253  -0.233 
26.Transportation and warehouse  -0.199  -0.190  -0.258  -0.254  -0.225 
27. FIRE  -0.295  -0.311  -0.290  -0.323  -0.305 
28. Health and social assistance  -0.422  -0.394  -0.403  -0.398  -0.404 
29. Other services    -0.448  -0.460  -0.472  -0.469  -0.462 
             
Notes: Regressions are the same as Table 2, except the interaction between the education and industry 
dummies. University graduates are the excluded category. Column 97–00 reports the mean of the 
estimates for 1997–2000.  
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Table 9: Means of Measures of Technological Change by Industry, 1997–2000 




1. Agriculture    0.25  0.56  0.86 
2. Forestry and logging    0.27  0.31  5.56 
3. Fishing, hunting, and trapping  0.61  0.98  0.90 
4. Mining and oil and gas extraction  0.42  0.48  9.61 
5. Utilities 
6. Construction 





12. Petroleum and coal 
13. Chemical and pharmaceutical 
14. Plastics and rubber 
15. Non-metallic mineral 
16. Primary metal 
17. Fabricated metal 
18. Machinery 
19. Computer and electronic 
20. Electrical appliances 
























































23. Other manufacturing    1.79  0.73  1.21 
24. Wholesale    1.11  1.21  1.66 
25. Retail  0.09  0.06  0.76 
26. Transportation and warehouse  0.06  0.05  1.46 
27. FIRE  0.08  0.21  4.34 
28. Health and social assistance  0.65  0.22  0.63 
29. Other services    0.70  0.66  6.18 
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Table 10. Effects of Technological Change on University–High School Wage Gap, 
1997–2000 
  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 




























         




























         




























Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). All regressions 
include year dummies.   36
Figure 1: University- High School Wage Gap, 1981- 2000 
Year
  Adjusted university/H.S. gap  University/H.S. gap






Figure 2: Aggregate Relative Supply of University-Educated Labour, 1981- 2000 
Year
 Log (university/high school)  Linear trend
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Figure 3: Aggregate Measures of Skill-Biased Technology, 1981–2000 
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Figure 4: Estimated University- High School Wage Gap by Age Group, 1981- 2000 
Year
  Age 26 - 35  Age 46 - 60
 Linear trend  Linear trend







Figure 5: Age-Specific Relative Supply of University-Educated Labour, 1981- 2000 
Year
  Age 26 - 35  Age 46 - 60
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Figure 6: Estimated University- High School Wage Gap by Sector, 1981- 1997 
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Appendix A: Indicators of Technological Change 
A.1  MFP growth  
This measure is available from Statistics Canada for 47 industries in the business sector 
between 1981 and 1997. In general, it is a residual measure of the change in gross output 
relative to the change in intermediate inputs, which include labour, energy, materials, and 
services. For more details on the calculation procedure, see Productivity Growth in 
Canada, Statistics Canada (Catalogue no. 15-204). 
 
A.2  The ratio of R&D expenditure to output 
The ratio of R&D expenditure to output is defined as the real R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of real output. Total R&D expenditure in current dollars is based on an annual 
survey conducted by Statistics Canada since 1955. Prior to 1997, all companies that 
performed R&D were included in the survey. Since that time, the survey sample has been 
limited to large firms that spend more than $1 million annually on R&D. Data for small 
firms are collected from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. The total expenditure 
on R&D includes: (1) labour costs, (2) fringe benefits, (3) purchases of materials and 
supplies, (4) contracts for services, and (5) capital expenditure, classified into land, 
building, and equipment. For more details, see various issues of Industrial Research and 
Development, Statistics Canada (Catalogue no. 88-202). The GDP deflator is used to 
obtain the real R&D expenditure. Real output for different industries is measured as the 
GDP at factor cost or basic prices. 
 
A.3  Percentage of employment engaged in R&D 
Data come from the same survey that collects information on R&D expenditure. The total 
number of persons engaged in R&D is calculated as the full-time equivalent (FTE). 
Adjustment is made for persons who work only part-time on R&D to estimate their FTE. 
For more details, see various issues of Industrial Research and Development, Statistics 
Canada (Catalogue no. 88-202). 
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A.4  The ratio of scientists and engineers to total employment 
Based on the occupational classification, this measure is calculated directly from the 
sample. For the SCF sample, “scientists and engineers” includes architects, engineers, 
and workers in occupations related to physical sciences, life sciences, mathematics, 
statistics, and systems analysis (i.e., 1980 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) = 
211, 213, 214, 215, 218). For the LFS sample, this group refers to professional 
occupations in natural and applied sciences (i.e., 1991 SOC = C0).   42 
Appendix B: Industry Groupings 
Original industry groupings in the SCF and LFS have to be recategorized to 
match the industry measure of technological change. Furthermore, workers in the public 
sector are excluded for two reasons. First, public workers in Canada are highly unionized 
(Robinson 1995). The literature (e.g., Freeman 1982 and Lemieux 1993) suggests that the 
wage distribution among union workers is more compressed. Second, there was public 
sector restructuring in the 1990s to cut deficits and reduce the debt burden at all levels of 
government. In addition to the significant decline in public sector employment (Fenton, 
Ip, and Wright 2001), the legislated wage freezes would affect the evolution of the wage 
premium. 
 
B.1  SCF 
Industries are grouped into 10 sectors, according to the 1980 Standard Industrial 
Classification: (1) agriculture; (2) other primary; (3) manufacturing, non-durables; (4) 
manufacturing, durables; (5) construction; (6) transportation, communication, and other 
utilities; (7) wholesale; (8) retail; (9) FIRE; and (10) other services. Table B1 gives a 
detailed breakdown of each sector and the employment share. As expected, the general 
pattern is an employment shift from the manufacturing sector to the service sector 
between 1981 and 1997. 
 
B.2  LFS 
Industry groupings in the LFS are more refined. Instead of the 10 sectors in the SCF, 
there are 29 industry groups under the North America Industry Classified System:  (1) 
agriculture; (2) forestry and logging; (3) fishing, hunting, and trapping; (4) mining and oil 
and gas extraction; (5) utilities; (6) construction; (7) food, beverages, and tobacco, (8) 
textiles; (9) wood; (10) paper; (11) printing; (12) petroleum and coal; (13) chemical and 
pharmaceutical products; (14) plastics and rubber products; (15) non-metallic mineral 
products; (16) primary metal; (17) fabricated metal products; (18) machinery; (19) 
computer and electronic products; (20) electrical equipment, appliances, and components;   43 
(21) transportation equipment; (22) furniture and related products; (23) other 
manufacturing; (24) wholesale; (25) retail; (26) transportation and warehouse; (27) FIRE; 
(28) health and social assistance; and (29) other services. Table B2 shows the 
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Table B1. Sectors in SCF 
Sector    Employment share (%) 
      1981  1997 
1. Agriculture 
 
  1.1  1.3 
2. Other primary    3.1  2.6 
  i)  Fishing, trapping, logging, and forestry 
ii)  Mining, quarrying, and oil wells  
 
   
3. Manufacturing, non-durables    11.7  10.0 
  Food, beverages, and tobacco 
Rubber and plastic products 
Leather and allied products 
Primary textile, textile products, and clothing 
Paper, printing, publishing, and allied products  
Refined petroleum and coal products 
Chemical and chemical products 
Other manufacturing 
 
   
4. Manufacturing, durables    12.1  10.0 
  i)  Wood, furniture, and fixture 
ii)  Primary metal, fabricated metal products 
iii)  Machinery and transportation equipment 
iv)  Electrical and electronic products non-metallic 
mineral products 
 
   
5. Construction 
 
  6.6  5.4 
6. Transportation, communication, and other utilities 
 
10.3  9.0 
7. Wholesale 
 
  5.3  5.2 
8. Retail 
 
  11.3  11.2 
9. Finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) 
 
6.5  6.2 
10. Other services    32.0  39.0 
  i)  Educational, health and social service 
ii)  Amusement and recreational  
iii)  Service religious organizations 
iv)  Accommodation, food, and beverage service 
v)  Personal and household service 
vi)  Membership organization 
vii)  Business services 
viii)  Miscellaneous services 
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Table B2. Industry Groupings in LFS 
Industry    Employment share (%) 
      1997  2000 
1. Agriculture    0.8  0.8 
2. Forestry and logging    0.6  0.6 
3. Fishing, hunting, and trapping  0.1  0.1 
4. Mining and oil and gas extraction    1.7  1.5 
5. Utilities 
6. Construction 





12. Petroleum and coal 
13. Chemical and pharmaceutical products 
14. Plastics and rubber products 
15. Non-metallic mineral products 
16. Primary metal 
17. Fabricated metal products 
18. Machinery 
19. Computer and electronic product 
20. Electrical equipment, appliances, and components  
21. Transportation equipment 





































23. Other m anufacturing    1.9  1.7 
  i)  Clothing and leather products 
ii)  Miscellaneous manufacturing 
   
24. Wholesale    3.7  4.2 
25. Retail  10.8  10.5 
26. Transportation and warehouse    5.9  6.1 
27. Finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE)  7.4  6.8 
28. Health and social assistance  12.5  12.6 
29. Other services    30.9  30.8 
  i)  Information, culture, and recreation 
ii)  Professional, scientific, and technical services 
iii)  Management and administrative 
iv)  Educational services 
v)  Accommodation and food service 
vi)  Miscellaneous services 
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